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Abstract
This paper provides the explicit expression of investment facing a binding
debt ceiling and the explicit expression of the Lagrange multipliers related to the
binding debt ceiling constraint. This result allows to check for misspecification
of the parameterizations of these Lagrange multipliers used in Euler investment
equations tests during the 1990’s.
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1. Introduction
Recent papers tested the Euler equation for capital of the neoclassical model of in-
vestment for an infinetely living firm facing quadratic adjustment costs, taxation,
imperfect competition on the goods market and an exogenous debt ceiling constraint
(see e.g. Gertler et al. [1990], Whited [1992] and subsequent papers surveyed in Schi-
antarelli [1996]). In his Journal of Economic Literature survey on the economics of
investment, Chirinko ([1993] pp.1902-1904) mentioned that, in these Euler equation
tests, “the endogenous variables that parameterize the Lagrange multiplier related to
this [borrowing] constraint (such as cash flow and net worth) are not accounted for
explicitly in specifying the econometric equation, thus blurring econometric interpreta-
tions of the statistical tests. It remains uncertain whether significant liquidity and net
worth variables are capturing a structural element heretofore missing in the investment
equation or are merely reflecting general misspecification.” This Lagrange multiplier
is parameterized in an ad hoc fashion in the belief that “the first order conditions do
not provide an analytical answer” (Whited [1992, p. 1435]). In this note, we provide
the analytical answer which was missing. This Lagrange multiplier is related to the
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gap between the standard neoclassical investment behaviour and the (explicit) credit
constrained investment. Both expressions are derived in this note, which allows to
check for misspecification in these empirical works.
2. Explicit Lagrange Multiplier
The standard partial equilibrium neoclassical model of investment begins with an
expression for the value of the firm, which in turn stems from the arbitrage condition
governing the valuation of shares. The after-tax return to the owners of the firm at
time t reflects capital appreciation and current dividends. In equilibrium, if the owners
are to be content holding their shares, this return must equal (1−mt)r0t the after tax
nominal return on riskless (government) bonds between period t and period t+ 1 (r0t
represents the nominal return before income tax and mt is the personal income tax
on dividends and interest income in period t):
(1− ct) (Et[Vi,t+1 − Si,t+1]− Vit) + (1−mt)θtEt[di,t+1]
Vit
= (1−mt)r0t (2.1)
where Vit is the value of the firm i at time t, Sit denotes the value of new shares
issued at time t+1, ct is the accrual-equivalent capital gains tax rate, θt is the dividend
received by the shareholder when the firm distributes one unit of post-corporate tax
earnings1. Therefore, the taxe rate on dividends is (1−mt)θt. Et is the expectation
operator conditional on information known at time t. The after-tax capital gain of
the current shareholders thus consists of the change in the market value of the firm
less the component of this change due to new share issues. The tax discrimination
parameter γt = (1−mt)θt/ (1− ct) determines the relative tax advantage of dividend
income against capital gains. The dividends of the firm i at time t are dit. In the
absence of bubbles, solving the capital market arbitrage condition yields the following
expression for the firm’s market value at time zero:
max
{pit,Iit,Lit,dit,Sit,Kit,Bit}∞t=0
Vi,t=0 = Et
t=+∞X
t=0
Ã
s=t−1Y
s=0
βis
!
(γtdit − Sit) (2.2)
where the firm’s one period nominal discount factor is:
βit =
1
1 +
³
1−mt
1−ct
´
r0t
(2.3)
The entrepreneur in firm i chooses dividends, investment, labour and price of
output in maximizing the present value of dividends di,t on date t in a infinite horizon,
with the discounted rate of the opportunity cost of internal funds, subject to several
1Under an imputation relationship between corporate and personal taxes, the parameter θt =
1/ (1− st) where st is the rate of imputation. Under a classical relationship, θt is simply unity.
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constraints. The “flow of funds” constraint defines firm dividends. Cash inflows
include sales, new share issues, and net borrowing, while cash outflows consist of
dividends, factor and interest payments, and investment expenditures:
dit = (1− τ) (pitF (Ki,t−1, Nit)− pitΨ(Iit,Ki,t−1)− wtNit − it−1Bt−1)
+Sit +Bit −Bi,t−1 − pIitIit, (2.4)
where Iit is its investment at time t, Kit is capital, Nit a vector of variable factors
of production for firm i at time t, F (Ki,t−1, Nit) the firm’s revenue function (FK >
0,FKK < 0), Ψ(Iit,Ki,t−1) the cost of adjusting the capital stock (ΨI > 0, ΨII > 0,
ΨK < 0, ΨIK < 0), wt a vector of nominal factor prices at time t, iit the nominal
interest rate on debt at time t, Bit = the value of net debt outstanding for firm i at
time t, pit = the price of final goods at time t, p
I
it = the price of capital goods at time t
(incorporating tax considerations); τ = the corporate income tax rate, against which
interest payments are assumed to be deductible.
The firm faces the capital accumulation constraint (with a related Lagrange mul-
tiplier λKit ): Kit = Iit + (1− δ)Ki,t−1 where δ a constant rate of economic depreci-
ation, an exogenous debt ceiling constraint (Bit ≤ B∗it, related Lagrange multiplier
λBit), and a positivity of dividends constraint (dit ≥ 0, related Lagrange multiplier
λdit). The firm also faces a downward sloping demand function ϕ (pit) for its prod-
uct with an absolute value of the elasticity denoted e = −ϕ0 (pit) pit/ϕ (pit). De-
mand is equal to supply, i.e. output net of adjustment costs, so that the value
of sales is the following function of inputs after inversion of the demand function:
ϕ−1 (F (Ki,t−1, Nit)−Ψ(Iit,Ki,t−1)) [F (Ki,t−1, Nit)−Ψ(Iit,Ki,t−1)]. The derivative of
sales with respect to an input X is therefore:
"
1 +
[F (Ki,t−1, Nit)−Ψ(Iit, Ki,t−1)]
pit
h
ϕ−1
i0#
pit [FX(Ki,t−1, Nit)−ΨX(Iit, Ki,t−1)]
(2.5)
I denote the inverse of the markup factor µ = 1− 1
e
> 0. The case of a price taker
perfect competitor is given by setting the parameter µ to unity each time it appears
before the output price in the following equations.
Dividends are substituted directly in the Lagrangean, using the flow of funds con-
straint as well as investment by the capital accumulation equation. The first order
conditions for capital Kit (Euler equation) is:
Etβit[
γt+1 + λ
d
i,t+1
γt + λdit
[µpi,t+1FK(Kit, Nit+1)− µpi,t+1ΨK(Ii,t+1,Kit) +
(1− δ)µpi,t+1ΨI(Ii,t+1, Ki,t) +
(1− δ)pIi,t+1
1− τt+1
]]
= pitµΨI(Ii,t,Ki,t−1) +
pIit
1− τt
(2.6)
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In the Euler equation for capital, the discount factor turns to be “corrected” by
a multiplicative factor Γit =
³
γt+1 + λ
d
i,t+1
´
/
³
γt + λ
d
i,t
´
. The marginal condition for
debt is:
EtβitΓit =
1− λ
B
it
γt+λdit
1 + [1− τt+1] iit
(2.7)
It reveals that the “corrected” discount factor βitΓit is equal to a discount factor
using the net of tax marginal cost of debt as a discount rate if λBit = 0, and else that the
discount factor decreases with the Lagrange multiplier of the debt ceiling constraint
(i.e. the discount factor should use the shadow interest rate that would have accepted
the firm if she was not facing a quantitative constraint).
Γit has been parameterized in an ad hoc manner in several papers following the
first ones surveyed by Chirinko [1993]. The aim of this note is to find its explicit
form, which amounts to find the explicit form for λdit. The Lagrange multiplier related
to a quantitative constraint is generally an increasing function of the gap between
the “notional” denoted IUCit and the “constrained” control variable (investment for
the firm facing credit rationing) denoted ICit . The expression γt + λ
d
it is given by the
marginal condition on investment in the credit rationing regime:
γt + λ
d
it =
λKit
pIit + µpit (1− τt)ΨI(ICit ,Ki,t−1)
(2.8)
where the marginal costate variable λKit is given by the marginal condition on
investment in the unconstrained regime (λdit = 0):
λKit = γt
h
pIit + µpit (1− τt)ΨI(IUCit ,Ki,t−1)
i
It is a function of the investment rate IUCit that would have chosen the firm in the
absence of financial constraint. A structural specification of Γit is therefore given by:
Γit =
pIit + µpit (1− τt)ΨI(ICit ,Ki,t−1)
γt [pIit + µpit (1− τt)ΨI(IUCit ,Ki,t−1)]
γt+1
h
pIi,t+1 + µpi,t+1 (1− τt+1)ΨI(IUCi,t+1,Kit)
i
pIi,t+1 + µpi,t+1 (1− τt+1)ΨI(ICi,t+1,Kit)
(2.9)
3. The case of quadratic adjustment costs
I parameterize the adjustment cost function with its usual quadratic formΨ(Iit,Ki,t−1) =
α
2
³
Ii,t
Ki,t−1
− ν
´2
Ki,t−1 (Whited [1992]), so that ΨI(Iit,Ki,t−1) = α
³
Ii,t
Ki,t−1
− ν
´
. The
next step is to solve for the investment solution facing a binding debt constraint³
ICit
´
or not
³
IUCit
´
.
On the one hand, when the firm does not face a debt constraint, the usual form is
derived by a local approximation near the equilibrium, on the unique stable path. The
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standard textbook result is that current investment net of long run investment (which
has only to replace the depreciation of the long run capital stock) is a linear function
of the wedge between the current capital stock and the long term capital stock:
IUCit = δK
∗
it + (σ − 1) (Kit −K∗it) (3.1)
K∗it is the long run stock of capital, defined by the Euler equation with stationary
values (it depends on the marginal cost of capital on date t corrected by the marginal
adjustment costs of long term investment). σ is the eigenvalue of the linearised dy-
namical discrete time system with an absolute value below one:
σ =
1
2

1 +
1
βitEt
pi,t+1
pit
−
vuuut1− 1
βitEt
pi,t+1
pit


2
− 4K
∗
itFKK (K
∗
it, N
∗
it)
α

 (3.2)
On the other hand, when the firm faces a binding debt ceiling constraint, the
flow of funds equation can be written in the binding debt ceiling regime on date t
(Bit = B
∗
it), with no dividends (dit = 0) and with no new share issues (Sit = 0):
0 = (1− τ)

pitF (Ki,t−1, Nt)− pit
α
2
Ã
Ii,t
Ki,t−1
− ν
!2
Ki,t−1 − wtNt − ii,t−1Bt−1


+B∗it −Bi,t−1 − pIitIit (3.3)
Dividing the flow of funds equation by the capital stock pIi,t−1Ki,t−1 and using the
capital accumulation relation (Kit = Iit+(1−δ)Ki,t−1), it follows a quadratic equation
for the ratio of the investment rate jit = Iit/Ki,t−1 depending on the ceiling of the
debt/capital ratio x∗it = B
∗
it/p
I
itKit:
0 = (1− τ)
µ
π(Ki,t−1, Nit)− pit
α
2
(jit − ν)2 − ii,t−1xi,t−1
¶
+x∗it
pIit
pIi,t−1
[jit + 1− δ]− xi,t−1 −
pIit
pIi,t−1
jit (3.4)
π(Ki,t−1, Nit) = [pitF (Ki,t−1, Nt)− wtNt] /pIitKit represents the profit rate. The
investment rate is an explicit solution of the quadratic equation:
0 = −(1− τ)pit
α
2
j2it +
"
(1− τ)pit
α
2
2v +
pIit
pIi,t−1
(x∗it − 1)
#
jit + Cit (3.5)
where : Cit = −(1− τ)pit
α
2
v2 + (1− τ)π(Ki,t−1, Nit)
+x∗it
pIit
pIi,t−1
[1− δ]− [1 + (1− τ)ii,t−1]xi,t−1 (3.6)
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so that2:
jCit (B
∗
it) = v +
pIit
pIi,t−1
x∗it − 1
(1− τ)αpit
+
vuut"v + pIit
pIi,t−1
x∗it − 1
(1− τ)αpit
#2
− 2 Cit
(1− τ)αpit
(3.7)
The first term of the Taylor development of this expression with respect to α, the
adjustment cost parameter, which is reasonably below one and small, leads to the
following expresssion (it corresponds to the case α = 0, i.e. there are no adjustment
costs):
jCit (B
∗
it) =
(1− τ) (pitF (Ki,t−1, Nt)− wtNt − ii,t−1Bt−1)
pIitKi,t−1
+
B∗it −Bi,t−1
pIitKi,t−1
(3.8)
Investment depends on after tax cash-flow from operating activities and on the
variation of debt. Squared terms of these variables could be added if one takes into
account the second order Taylor development with respect to α.
Explanatory variables of Γit are the explanatory variables of the financially con-
strained investment and of the unconstrained investment function. Γit can also be
linearised for a small adjustment cost parameter. Then, explanatory variables are the
first diﬀerences of the variables determining investment facing credit rationing (cash
flow from operating activities and the variation of debt) and of the variables related
to the unconstrained investment level (the current size of capital of the firm Kit and
the cost of capital, which determines the long run stock of capital K∗it). This explicit
Lagrange multiplier suggests specifications closer to the structural one for Euler equa-
tion tests of financial constraints. For example, Whited [1992] intuitions for the choice
of the financial variables were right. But these variables ought to have appeared in
first diﬀerence in Γit. Then, variables related to the unconstrained investment such as
the current size of the capital stock and the cost of capital were omitted. Finally, the
estimated parameters related to these extra financial variables were not constrained
whereas they cannot be anything else than a combination of the parameters to be
estimated in the optimization model written at the very beginning, i.e. the mark-up
rate µ and the coeﬃcient of adjustment costs α.
4. Conclusion
This note derives the explicit expression of investment facing a debt ceiling and of the
Lagrange multiplier related to a binding debt ceiling constraint. These two results may
2If the adjustment cost parameter α is small enough, then one obtains v + p
I
it
pI
i,t−1
xit−1
(1−τ)αpit < 0,
(the ceiling of the debt/capital ratio xit is necessarily below one). The second solution for investment
is negative, and therefore irrelevant for the behaviour of a firm facing a debt ceiling constraint.
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help to precise and develop tests on investment facing capital market imperfections.
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